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Is the profit incentive Healthy?
Well if you read *Death By Medicine* you know that the medical field as it is now in the United States is in need of reform.
Here are more reasons to be Leary of what is being prescribed and by who.
Is the profit incentive Healthy?
Well if you read *Death By Medicine* you know that the medical field as it is now in the United States is in need of reform.
Here are more reasons to be Leary of what is being prescribed and by who.
NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL of MEDICINE
Perspective
April 26, 2007
Perspective
April 26, 2007
Paying for Drug Approvals — Who’s Using Whom?
Jerry Avorn, M.D.
Jerry Avorn, M.D.
Years ago, an administrator at a community hospital explained to me how well his institution’s grand-rounds program worked. “The drug companies find the speakers, pay their honoraria, and provide free food for the doctors,
which helps a lot with attendance,”he said. “It works well for us, especially
with our budgets so tight.”Yet those lunches were actually quite costly for the hospital: attendees at such events predictably go on to prescribe the products
promoted there — which is precisely why the drug companies so willingly pay for these programs.
This penetration of commerce into the province of science isn’t limited to continuing medical education. Since 1992, the United States has relied heavily on the pharmaceutical industry to pay the salaries of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) scientists who review new drug applications. The
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) is now up for its periodic 5-year renewal, and Congress seems ready to reauthorize it with the same short-sightedness that afflicted that naive hospital administrator.
PDUFA was enacted at the end of the presidency of George H.W.
Bush, when many in Washington believed that government was at
the root of most of the country’s problems. At that time, the FDA
was having difficulty evaluating new drugs quickly and efficiently.
The agency had been shaken by sit-ins held by AIDS activists protesting
long review times, which they argued were killing them. The staff of the FDA was too small to adequately assess all the new drug applications the agency received.
But the era’s dominant ideology derided “bloated government” and
demanded that Congress rein in “runaway spending.” In that climate,
the sensible policy solution — provide the FDA with more federal
funding to hire enough people to carry out its mission —was a nonstarter. But just as the FDA’s slowness may have been costing patients with AIDS their
lives, it was costing pharmaceutical manufacturers their income.
So the industry stepped in and helped to design a plan under which companies would pay the salaries of agency employees who reviewed the companies’ submissions.
There were problems with the user-fee approach from the beginning.
The original legislation required that no portion of companies' fees
which helps a lot with attendance,”he said. “It works well for us, especially
with our budgets so tight.”Yet those lunches were actually quite costly for the hospital: attendees at such events predictably go on to prescribe the products
promoted there — which is precisely why the drug companies so willingly pay for these programs.
This penetration of commerce into the province of science isn’t limited to continuing medical education. Since 1992, the United States has relied heavily on the pharmaceutical industry to pay the salaries of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) scientists who review new drug applications. The
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) is now up for its periodic 5-year renewal, and Congress seems ready to reauthorize it with the same short-sightedness that afflicted that naive hospital administrator.
PDUFA was enacted at the end of the presidency of George H.W.
Bush, when many in Washington believed that government was at
the root of most of the country’s problems. At that time, the FDA
was having difficulty evaluating new drugs quickly and efficiently.
The agency had been shaken by sit-ins held by AIDS activists protesting
long review times, which they argued were killing them. The staff of the FDA was too small to adequately assess all the new drug applications the agency received.
But the era’s dominant ideology derided “bloated government” and
demanded that Congress rein in “runaway spending.” In that climate,
the sensible policy solution — provide the FDA with more federal
funding to hire enough people to carry out its mission —was a nonstarter. But just as the FDA’s slowness may have been costing patients with AIDS their
lives, it was costing pharmaceutical manufacturers their income.
So the industry stepped in and helped to design a plan under which companies would pay the salaries of agency employees who reviewed the companies’ submissions.
There were problems with the user-fee approach from the beginning.
The original legislation required that no portion of companies' fees
(about half a million dollars per drug reviewed) could be spent to evaluate drug side effects after approval — the time when many important safety concerns become apparent. The new law mandated strict deadlines for
approval decisions. To comply, the FDA reassigned staff scientists
to work on new drug applications, pulling the scientists from other regulatory activities. Several were taken from the Office of Drug Safety, which conducts
adverse-effects surveillance — a move that helped to shrink and demoralize that unit. User fees now account for more than 40% of the budget of the
FDA division that reviews new drug applications.
Colleagues at the FDA have told me of a worrisome side effect of PDUFA: the growing sense that the organization is accountable to the industry it regulates. One FDA scientist who was often criticized for being too concerned about
drug-risk data was told by his supervisor to remember that the agency’s client was the pharmaceutical industry.
“That’s odd,” he replied. “I thought our clients were the people of the United
States.” Other agency staffers report pressure to rush through the drug-approval process, although the FDA’s regulatory review times are already among the shortest in the world. Evidence is accumulating that this emphasis on speed
may lead to problematic decision making. Data analyzed by Daniel Carpenter, a professor of government at Harvard University, suggest that drugs approved just before PDUFA deadlines are far more likely than those approved at other
points in the review cycle to cause safety problems after they are in widespread use.
Most federal regulatory agencies do not derive such a large proportion of their operating budgets from the industries they oversee. Nor is it typical for such relationships to be negotiated so cozily between the government and the trade group representing the industry. Yet the current FDA proposal for PDUFA renewal was developed in concert with the Pharmaceutical and Research Manufacturers of America.
2 No similar influence has been exerted by any other group. In 2004, the public was shocked to learn that rofecoxib (Vioxx, Merck) could remain in widespread
use for 5 years even though the drug nearly doubled the risk of myocardial infarction and stroke.
Its withdrawal from the market aroused serious doubts about the adequacy of the FDA’s drug-safety surveillance system. Last year, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released influential
reports concluding that the country’s capacity for identifying drug risks was greatly in need of repair 3,4; the IOM report proposed a number of specific and plausible recommendations for reform.
approval decisions. To comply, the FDA reassigned staff scientists
to work on new drug applications, pulling the scientists from other regulatory activities. Several were taken from the Office of Drug Safety, which conducts
adverse-effects surveillance — a move that helped to shrink and demoralize that unit. User fees now account for more than 40% of the budget of the
FDA division that reviews new drug applications.
Colleagues at the FDA have told me of a worrisome side effect of PDUFA: the growing sense that the organization is accountable to the industry it regulates. One FDA scientist who was often criticized for being too concerned about
drug-risk data was told by his supervisor to remember that the agency’s client was the pharmaceutical industry.
“That’s odd,” he replied. “I thought our clients were the people of the United
States.” Other agency staffers report pressure to rush through the drug-approval process, although the FDA’s regulatory review times are already among the shortest in the world. Evidence is accumulating that this emphasis on speed
may lead to problematic decision making. Data analyzed by Daniel Carpenter, a professor of government at Harvard University, suggest that drugs approved just before PDUFA deadlines are far more likely than those approved at other
points in the review cycle to cause safety problems after they are in widespread use.
Most federal regulatory agencies do not derive such a large proportion of their operating budgets from the industries they oversee. Nor is it typical for such relationships to be negotiated so cozily between the government and the trade group representing the industry. Yet the current FDA proposal for PDUFA renewal was developed in concert with the Pharmaceutical and Research Manufacturers of America.
2 No similar influence has been exerted by any other group. In 2004, the public was shocked to learn that rofecoxib (Vioxx, Merck) could remain in widespread
use for 5 years even though the drug nearly doubled the risk of myocardial infarction and stroke.
Its withdrawal from the market aroused serious doubts about the adequacy of the FDA’s drug-safety surveillance system. Last year, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released influential
reports concluding that the country’s capacity for identifying drug risks was greatly in need of repair 3,4; the IOM report proposed a number of specific and plausible recommendations for reform.
By coincidence, this year PDUFA is up for renewal. For a time, it seemed possible that this combination of forces would lead to concrete steps to build a better system for drug approval and adverse-effects surveillance.
But the legislative plans that are likely to be enacted do not even come close to achieving that goal. At a recent meeting on the FDA’s future, all four former
FDA commissioners in attendance agreed that the agency should be funded directly through the Treasury, rather than through industry payments. But Congress and the agency’s leadership still don’t get it. The FDA supports reauthorization of PDUFA and proposes that a trivial less than 7% of the
user fees be used to strengthen its capacity for adverse-effects surveillance
— an amount far short of what would be needed to repair the inadequate system described by the IOM and GAO. Another key problem may not be fixed by Congress either.
The FDA currently lacks the authority to require companies to conduct
follow-up studies of suspected safety problems. Most such studies are therefore not performed, even when they are requested.
But the requisite legislation to give the agency this vital authority also seems unlikely to emerge from this Congress.
Proponents of retaining PDUFA argue that the discretionary federal budget has been so decimated that it’s impossible to find public dollars to replace the
$438 million in user-fee revenues projected for 2008. Yet with Medicare
now the largest purchaser of drugs in the United States, this is a fiscally irresponsible excuse.
Many drug-safety researchers believe, for example, that appropriately conducted studies would have revealed the cardiovascular toxicity of rofecoxib well before the end of its 5-year run. By that point, the country was spending $2.5 billion per year on the drug, about a billion of which was public money.
Documenting the drug’s risks and getting it off the market just 1 year sooner would have paid for a robust system of drug safety surveillance for 4 years,
without relying on a dime of user fees or additional taxpayer dollars.
We spend more than $3 billion on the Iraq war in about a week. A nation as wealthy as ours can afford what it chooses to afford.
The present confluence of events surrounding PDUFA reauthorization could have provided the best opportunity in a generation to act decisively in mending
our dysfunctional drug-approval and surveillance system. But Congress,
the FDA, and the drug industry risk missing this opportunity.
“The train has left the station” is how Capitol staffers describe the inevitable renewal of the plan and the rushed schedule of its legislative trajectory. But
that needn’t be the case.
But the legislative plans that are likely to be enacted do not even come close to achieving that goal. At a recent meeting on the FDA’s future, all four former
FDA commissioners in attendance agreed that the agency should be funded directly through the Treasury, rather than through industry payments. But Congress and the agency’s leadership still don’t get it. The FDA supports reauthorization of PDUFA and proposes that a trivial less than 7% of the
user fees be used to strengthen its capacity for adverse-effects surveillance
— an amount far short of what would be needed to repair the inadequate system described by the IOM and GAO. Another key problem may not be fixed by Congress either.
The FDA currently lacks the authority to require companies to conduct
follow-up studies of suspected safety problems. Most such studies are therefore not performed, even when they are requested.
But the requisite legislation to give the agency this vital authority also seems unlikely to emerge from this Congress.
Proponents of retaining PDUFA argue that the discretionary federal budget has been so decimated that it’s impossible to find public dollars to replace the
$438 million in user-fee revenues projected for 2008. Yet with Medicare
now the largest purchaser of drugs in the United States, this is a fiscally irresponsible excuse.
Many drug-safety researchers believe, for example, that appropriately conducted studies would have revealed the cardiovascular toxicity of rofecoxib well before the end of its 5-year run. By that point, the country was spending $2.5 billion per year on the drug, about a billion of which was public money.
Documenting the drug’s risks and getting it off the market just 1 year sooner would have paid for a robust system of drug safety surveillance for 4 years,
without relying on a dime of user fees or additional taxpayer dollars.
We spend more than $3 billion on the Iraq war in about a week. A nation as wealthy as ours can afford what it chooses to afford.
The present confluence of events surrounding PDUFA reauthorization could have provided the best opportunity in a generation to act decisively in mending
our dysfunctional drug-approval and surveillance system. But Congress,
the FDA, and the drug industry risk missing this opportunity.
“The train has left the station” is how Capitol staffers describe the inevitable renewal of the plan and the rushed schedule of its legislative trajectory. But
that needn’t be the case.
Recently, I joined a group of drug-safety experts — several of them former
FDA scientists or authors of the IOM drug-safety report — in calling for the FDA’s drug-related work to be funded by general federal revenues, rather than by the industry it regulates.
We argued that if this change cannot be accomplished before the current user-fee act expires on September 30 (and with it the salaries of many FDA drug reviewers), then PDUFA should be renewed for 6 to 12 months at most, to give the country time to have the debate we deserve over the best way to ensure the efficacy and safety of our medications.
5. Many in Congress still believe that the user-fee system is saving the public money. That view is as invalid as the smug conclusion of the hospital administrator I spoke with years ago. In regulatory policy, as in grand rounds,
there’s no such thing as a free lunch. An interview with Dr. Avorn and Dr.
Mark McClellan can be heard at www.nejm.org.
Dr. Avorn is a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and chief of the Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics at Brigham and Women’s Hospital — both in Boston.
1. Carpenter D, Bowers J, Grimmer J, Moffitt S, Nall C, Zucker EJ. Deadline effects in drug regulatory review.
Robert Wood Johnson Scholars in Health Policy Research Program, Working Paper Series, February 2007.
(Accessed April 5, 2007, at http://www.defendingscience.org.)
healthpolicyscholars.org/sub-news/working_
papers/working_paper_35.htm.)
Food and Drug Administration. Prescription
drug user fee act. Fed Regist 2007;72:
1743-53.
Drug safety: improvement needed in
FDA’s postmarket decision-making and
oversight process. Washington, DC: Government
Accountability Office, 2006. (Document
no. GAO-06-402.)
Committee on the Assessment of the US
Drug Safety System, Baciu A, Stratton K,
Burke SP, eds. The future of drug safety: promoting
and protecting the health of the public.
Washington, DC: National Academies
Press, 2006.
Angell M, Avorn J, Bingham E, et al. An
open letter to Chairman Edward Kennedy
and Senator Mike Enzi, Chairman John Dingell
and Representative Joe Barton, Members
of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions Committee, Members of House
Energy and Commerce Committee. March
14, 2007. (Accessed April 5, 2007, at http://
www.defendingscience.org.)
Copyright © 2007 Massachusetts Medical Society.
FDA scientists or authors of the IOM drug-safety report — in calling for the FDA’s drug-related work to be funded by general federal revenues, rather than by the industry it regulates.
We argued that if this change cannot be accomplished before the current user-fee act expires on September 30 (and with it the salaries of many FDA drug reviewers), then PDUFA should be renewed for 6 to 12 months at most, to give the country time to have the debate we deserve over the best way to ensure the efficacy and safety of our medications.
5. Many in Congress still believe that the user-fee system is saving the public money. That view is as invalid as the smug conclusion of the hospital administrator I spoke with years ago. In regulatory policy, as in grand rounds,
there’s no such thing as a free lunch. An interview with Dr. Avorn and Dr.
Mark McClellan can be heard at www.nejm.org.
Dr. Avorn is a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and chief of the Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics at Brigham and Women’s Hospital — both in Boston.
1. Carpenter D, Bowers J, Grimmer J, Moffitt S, Nall C, Zucker EJ. Deadline effects in drug regulatory review.
Robert Wood Johnson Scholars in Health Policy Research Program, Working Paper Series, February 2007.
(Accessed April 5, 2007, at http://www.defendingscience.org.)
healthpolicyscholars.org/sub-news/working_
papers/working_paper_35.htm.)
Food and Drug Administration. Prescription
drug user fee act. Fed Regist 2007;72:
1743-53.
Drug safety: improvement needed in
FDA’s postmarket decision-making and
oversight process. Washington, DC: Government
Accountability Office, 2006. (Document
no. GAO-06-402.)
Committee on the Assessment of the US
Drug Safety System, Baciu A, Stratton K,
Burke SP, eds. The future of drug safety: promoting
and protecting the health of the public.
Washington, DC: National Academies
Press, 2006.
Angell M, Avorn J, Bingham E, et al. An
open letter to Chairman Edward Kennedy
and Senator Mike Enzi, Chairman John Dingell
and Representative Joe Barton, Members
of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions Committee, Members of House
Energy and Commerce Committee. March
14, 2007. (Accessed April 5, 2007, at http://
www.defendingscience.org.)
Copyright © 2007 Massachusetts Medical Society.
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Autoship---------------40% discount
NOTE: Immunocal is called HMS90 in Canada.
